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Abstract. We analyze the implications of innovation and social interactions on economic
growth in a stylized endogenous growth model with heterogenous research firms. A large
number of research firms decide whether to innovate or not, by taking into account what
competitors (i.e., other firms) do. This is due to the fact that their profits partly depend on
an externality related to the share of firms which actively engage in research activities. Such
a share of innovative firms also determines the evolution of technology in the macroeconomy,
which ultimately drives economic growth. We show that when the externality effect is strong
enough multiple BGP equilibria may exist. In such a framework, the economy may face
a low growth trap suggesting that it may end up in a situation of slow long run growth;
however, such an outcome may be fully solved by government intervention. We also show
that whenever multiple BGP exist, the economy may cyclically fluctuate between the low
and high BGP as a result of shocks affecting the individual behavior of research firms.
Keywords: Economic Growth, Innovation; Firms Interaction; Low Growth Trap; Fluctua-
tions
JEL Classification Numbers: C60, D70, O40
Correspondence to:
Marco Tolotti Department of Management
Ca’ Foscari University of Venice
Cannaregio, 873
30121 Venice, Italy
Phone: [++39] 041-234-6928
Fax: [++39] 041-234-7444
E-mail: tolotti@unive.it
1 Introduction
Technological progress is by far the most important determinant of economic growth in
industrialized economies. During the last two decades, after the seminal works of Romer
(1986), Aghion & Howitt (1992), and Grossman & Helpman (1994), many efforts have
been put forward to try understanding and explaining the sources of technological advances.
All the resulting works take the nature of the research sector as given, and the interaction
among firms in the research industry has never been analyzed in depth thus far1. This is
however one of the main fields of interest of computational economics; heterogeneous agent
models, for instance, may help in explaining how innovation occurs, which are the dynamics
of innovation and how innovation determines technological progress (see Dawid (2006) for
an extensive survey). The goal of this paper is to bridge these two different branches of
literature by developing a stylized but analytically tractable and micro-founded agent based
model of innovation to shed some light on the role that interactions among research firms
might play in the process of economic growth. Once an almost traditional economic growth
model is extended to allow some form of interaction among research firms along the lines
outlined in Brock & Durlauf (2001) and Blume & Durlauf (2003), some traditional results,
like the uniqueness of equilibrium, found in growth theory vanish. Indeed, such an interaction
among research firms, by determining the rate of technological progress, plays a critical role
in shaping the whole macroeconomic dynamics. We show that, under certain parameter
conditions, the economy may be characterized by a multiplicity of balanced growth path
(BGP) equilibria, and a situation of low growth trap. We also show that the economy may
eventually (endogenously) fluctuate between the low and high BGP generating thus a growth
cycle in which periods of low and high economic growth rates follow one another. In this
context economic policy, aiming to modify the incentives associated with research activities,
may be very effective in order to completely solve the low growth trap problem, avoiding thus
further fluctuations in economic activity.
Our paper is thus related to different branches of the economic literature, namely com-
putational economics, economic growth and business cycles theory. From the computational
economics literature we simply borrow the interest in analyzing the interaction between re-
search firms and its eventual implications for technological progress and the long run economic
growth (Dawid (2006), Dosi et al. (2010)). However, from a methodological point of view
our approach is substantially different since we develop a very simple and tractable model,
in which most of the results are analytically derived; simulations in our paper play only a
marginal role and are instrumental to exemplify some interesting and potential outcomes.
Economic growth theory is the main benchmark for our analysis since the model is an almost
standard continuous time model of optimal growth with endogenous technological progress
(Acemoglu (2009)). With respect to what traditionally assumed in this literature (Romer
(1986), Grossman & Helpman (1994)), we allow for a certain degree of diffusion in the pattern
1Schumpeterian growth models to some extent model the interaction in the research sector by allowing for
a business-stealing effect, determining the likelihood that an incumbent innovator looses its monopoly power
because of a success in the innovation process by a new entrant (Acemoglu (2009)). Apart from this type of
characterization, the endogenous growth literature has not emphasized how the choice of research firms are
related and interdependent.
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of innovation, meaning that in our framework technical progress is driven by the interaction
among research firms.2 To the best of our knowledge, no other study has thus far focused
on the firms interaction in the research industry in a way comparable to ours, and moreover
all the works identify a unique BGP equilibrium thus cyclical behavior cannot occur. The
understanding and characterization of cyclical patterns is the main interest of the business
cycle theory3 (Kydland and Prescott (1982), King et al. (1988a), King et al. (1988b)), which
besides adopting a discrete time framework4 (Evans et al. (1998); Furukawa (2007)), it also
relies upon stochastic growth models in which the source of the shock is completely exogenous
(Walde (2005)). Probably, the work most close to ours is Bambi et al. (2014), which analyzes
an endogenous growth model with expanding product variety showing that cyclical fluctua-
tions may arise as a result of implementation delays in the innovation process. Despite their
setting is quite similar to ours (an almost traditional endogenous growth model) the mecha-
nism underlying output fluctuations is substantially different since we do not allow for time
delays but simply for some sort of interaction among firms operating in the research industry.
Moreover, different from them, our model shows the existence of a growth trap threshold,
allowing to clearly distinguish economies which will experience low and high growth rates,
which is again simply due to the interaction among research firms.
Therefore, our paper is also closely related to the literature on poverty traps. The even-
tual existence and characteristics of poverty traps have been extensively analyzed in literature
since the seminal work by Skiba (1978). Different explanations of why multiplicity of equi-
libria and thus poverty traps may exist have been put forward, and they include increasing
returns and imperfect competition, coordination failure, matching problems and increasing
returns (see Azariadis and Stachurski (2005) for an exhaustive survey). However, all these
theories proposed thus far outline sources of multiplicity in levels, suggesting thus that un-
der certain conditions an economy may eventually end up in poverty, that is a situation of
stagnation with no long run growth. Our model instead suggests the potential existence
2This is in line to what suggested by the seminar work by Bass (1969) in the context of diffusion of durables.
The Bass model is a particular case of a larger class of epidemiological models. We refer the reader to Hethcote
(2000) for a recent survey on the topic.
3Cyclical outcomes are also analyzed in growth theory by characterizing the eventual existence of equi-
librium indeterminacy (Benhabib and Farmer (1994); Benhabib and Farmer (1998)). Also this approach is
substantially different from ours, since our BGP equilibria are all determinate.
4Because of the similarity with our paper and their qualitative results, the seminal work by Evans et al.
(1998) deserves some specific comments. Indeed, also Evans et al. (1998) show that under specific conditions a
stylized economic growth model may give rise to a low growth trap and a growth cycle in which the economy
stochastically switches between periods of low and high growth. However, the underlying argument and the
type of dynamics at the basis of their analysis is substantially different from ours, since, apart from relying on
a discrete time setup, the driver of the entire economic dynamics in their model is represented by shocks on
agents’ expectations which affect the learning dynamics associated with multiple perfect-foresight equilibria.
Our results, instead, are derived in a micro-founded model where firm-specific shocks within the research
industry, by determining the evolution of technology, propagate in the whole economy eventually generating
growth cycles; the concept of endogenous fluctuations we describe is thus not related to either expectational
indeterminacy or self-fulfilling growth cycles, which represent the traditional mechanisms discussed in hte
business cycle literature (Evans et al. (1998); Furukawa (2007)). The fact that such very different setups allow
to generate qualitatively similar dynamics suggest that endogenous growth cycles and low growth traps are not
only rare theoretical possibility but rather outcomes quite common whenever we depart from the traditional
economic growth framework.
2
of equilibrium multiplicity in growth rates, meaning that an economy may eventually end
up in a situation of long run growth characterized by low growth rates. In order to distin-
guish this result from what traditionally discussed in the poverty traps literature we refer
to such an outcome as a “low growth trap”. To the best of our knowledge, apart the very
recent paper by Age´nor and Canuto (2015) in an overlapping generation setting, there is
no other study characterizing the eventual existence of low growth traps. The implications
of the existence of a low growth trap threshold are however very intuitive and in line with
empirical evidence: some countries will experience fast economic growth while others slow
economic growth, meaning that income gaps will tend to widen over time characterizing thus
a situation of long run divergence, as traditionally found in the empirics on economic growth,
especially between developed and developing countries5 (Dowrick (1992), Pritchett (1997)).
Finally, our model predicts a very important role for economic policy, since in the case of a
low growth trap the government, by simply rising the level of taxation on households in order
to increase the revenues granted to research firms, may be able to completely solve the trap
problem. This does not simply mean that the low growth trap threshold may be exceeded, as
the traditional policy implication of poverty trap models (see for example Sachs et al (2004),
or more recently La Torre et al. (2015)), but that the threshold itself will cease to exist
ensuring thus that the economy is able to experience fast economic growth.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 focuses on the research industry and describes
its peculiarities without considering its implications for the whole economy. Specifically, the
research industry is populated by a large number of profit-seeking firms facing a dichotomous
choice. On the one hand, these firms are heterogeneous in their propensity to innovate,
and on the other hand, their decision whether to innovate or not is partly affected by the
behavior of other firms in the industry through an externality component. We characterize
the research industry dynamics deriving an explicit expression which allows us to describe
the (aggregate) behavior of research firm in terms of the share of firms actively engaged in
research activities. Section 3 integrates the research industry in a traditional macroeconomic
model of endogenous growth, where the government finances research by taxing households,
and the overall level of technology in the economy depends on the share of firms engaged
in innovation. Section 4 shows that the balanced growth path (BGP) equilibrium, which
strictly depends upon the behavior of research firms, may or may not be unique according to
the magnitude of the externality-induced profit component; we also characterize the dynamic
properties of different BGP equilibria, identifying the eventual existence of a low growth
trap along with its policy implications, and the possibility of cyclical behavior. In Section
5 we discuss how our model relates to the middle-income trap hypothesis, suggesting that
after a first stage of take off characterized by rapid growth developing countries may face a
significant growth slowdown; differently from previous research which identify mainly inter-
sectoral dynamics as a potential source of growth slowdowns, we argue that this may also be
the result of intra-sectoral dynamics (driven by social interactions and technology diffusion)
within the research industry. Section 6 presents concluding remarks and proposes directions
5Despite the existence of some (absolute) convergence within a small number of industrialized countries
(see, for example, Barro and Sala–i–Martin (1995)), convergence clubs represent more the exception rather
than the rule in the empirics of economic growth.
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for future research.
2 Research Activities and Intra-Industry Interactions
We consider a research industry populated by a large number of research firms which try to
maximize the profits associated with their research activities; specifically, there exist N firms
indexed by i = 1, . . . , N . For the sake of simplicity we assume that the research choice is
just binary, thus we do not try to properly quantify research efforts. Thus, any research firm
needs to decide whether to engage in research activities or not, thus it needs to compare the
profit it will obtain by performing research with the zero-profit associated with no research
activities.
If a firm actively engages in research activities it will give rise with no uncertainty to an
innovation, which generates a given (fixed) amount of revenues h ≥ 0 associated with the
sale of the (unitary) innovation6. In order to produce one unit of innovation, the firm faces
a (stochastic) production cost z + ζi, where z ≥ 0 denotes the cost common to all the firms
and ζi is a random firm-specific shock. Apart from these private components of the profit
structure, research profits are also affected by a social component associated with the number
of firms actively engaged in research activities. Specifically, the size of the research industry
through an externality7 channel determines whether profits, ceteris paribus, tend to rise or
fall. There are two different cases that need to be considered: an increase in the number of
firms actively engaged in research may increase the profit for the whole research industry and
thus rise the profit of the individual research firm; alternatively, an increase in the number
of firms actively engaged in research may decrease the profit for the whole research industry
and thus lower the profit of the individual research firm. The former case represents the
so-called “standing-on-the-shoulder effect”, that is innovation by some firms increases the
possibility of further innovation by others, while the latter case the “fishing-out effect”, that
is innovation by some firms decreases the possibility of further innovation by others (Jones
(2005)). Formally, we model the individual firm research profits as in random utility models
(see Brock & Durlauf (2001) and Barucci & Tolotti (2012)). Each firm is thus characterized
by its specific innovative attitude ωi,t ∈ {0; 1}, where ωi,t = 1 (ωi,t = 0) denotes that firm
i is (is not) innovating at time t. The decision to engage in research activities to produce
innovation is based on the following profit structure:
pii(ωi) = ωi
[
h− (z + ζi) + J
(
x˜ei −
1
2
)]
. (1)
If the firm does not innovate (ωi,t = 0) the profit above is simply null, pii(0) = 0. If the
firm does innovate (ωi,t = 1) the profit is equal to pii(1) = [h− (z + ζi) + J(x˜ei − 1/2)],
6For the time being we do not look at the demand side of the innovation market, but this will be introduced
in a very stylized way in section 3, where we assume that the government buys such an innovation. The amount
of revenue h can thus be interpreted as the incentive provided by the government to induce firms to perform
research activities, or alternatively as the price at which it purchases the innovation from research firms.
7This externality in research profits may be interpreted in terms of the availability of potential trading
partners for the innovation, which reflects into a larger or smaller willingness to produce according to the sign
of J in (1). With this respect, the market for innovation is similar to the trading market proposed in Diamond
(1982).
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where the first two terms represent the private component of profit while the third term
is the social component related to the effect of externalities. The impact of the research
externality is equal to J(x˜ei − 1/2), where J ∈ R determines the sign and the magnitude of
the externality effect and x˜ei is the expectation of firm i about the average of the choices
of others firms: x˜ei =
1
N−1E[
∑
j 6=i ωj ]. Note that the sign of J determines the type of
externality affecting research firms: whenever J > 0 individual profits tend to increase as a
result of the research performed by others (standing-on-the-shoulder effect), while whenever
J < 0 individual profits tend to fall (fishing-out effect). The term (x˜ei − 1/2) states that
in quantifying the impact of the (positive or negative) externality-induced profit component
firms look at what the majority of other firms does. Indeed, the term 1/2 refers exactly to
one half of the total population of research firms, thus if x˜ei > 1/2 then firm i will expect more
than half of the firms to do research. Finally, the random components of cost, ζi, i = 1, . . . , N
are i.i.d. random shocks drawn from a common distribution η, which affect with different
intensity the perceived profit of individual firms. Two remarks on the profit structure are
needed. First of all, note that the profit pi depends on the subjective expectation of the firm
about others’ actions. With this respect, it can be seen as the realized profit once conditioned
on agent’s expectation about others’ actions. Secondly, the random component of the profit
is entirely related to the cost structure. We could in principle build a profit structure where
randomness may inpact jointly or separately both revenues and costs. Besides amounting
in a more complicated probabilistic structure, this woud not have any significant qualitatve
implications. For a more comprehensive discussion about the rationale behind the profit
structure as in (1), we refer the reader to Appendix A.
It can be easily verified that profits as in (1) turn into a probabilistic choice model where:
P(ωi = 1| x˜ei ) = η
[
h− z + J
(
x˜ei −
1
2
)]
. (2)
As shown in the literature on social interactions (see Blume & Durlauf (2003)), a dynamic
counterpart of such a model can be derived. Define xNt =
1
N
∑N
i=1 ωi,t as the fraction of
innovative firms at time t and assume this quantity is observable; we refer to xNt as the
“innovation share”. Similarly as in the static model, we assume that firms can decide whether
to invest or not at any time t by considering its potential revenue h, cost z and the current
value of the innovation share x˜ei . Indeed,
P(ωi,t+∆t = 1|ωi,t, xNt ) = η
[
h− z + J
(
xNt −
1
2
)]
. (3)
It turns out that the Markovian dynamics induced by (3) are difficult to study in the finite
dimensional population model; nevertheless, it is possible to describe in closed-form the
(deterministic) dynamics emerging from the asymptotic system when letting the number of
research firms go to infinity. In particular, the following result describes the time evolution
of xt which is the fraction of innovative firms at time t when we let N → ∞. To this aim,
5
we assume that the shocks ζi follow a centered logistic distribution
8 with parameter β > 0
η(x) = P(ζi ≤ x) = 1
1 + e−β x
.
In this context, β is a measure of the dispersion of opinion in the population of firms: β = 0
would represent a situation in which the firms decide to invest or not by tossing a coin; on
the contrary, β → ∞ would mean that the firms do not receive any stochastic signal (i.e.,
the random cost component) and decide just by looking at the sign of h − z + J (xNt − 12).
In the next proposition we state a convergence result in the number of firms and we describe
the dynamics of xt, the equilibrium fraction of research firms.
Proposition 1. Let xNt =
1
N
∑N
i=1 ωi,t be the share of innovative firms at time t. Suppose
limN→∞ xN0 = x0. Then, when N → ∞, the family of stochastic processes (xN )N≥0, where
xN := (xNt )t≥0, converges almost surely to x := (xt)t≥0, where xt solves
x˙t =
1
2
tanh
{
β
[
h− z + J
(
xt − 1
2
)]}
− xt + 1
2
, (4)
for a given initial condition x0.
Proof. We can recover the standard Blume & Durlauf (2003) framework by rearranging the
state variables to take values on {−1; +1}. Define ζi = 1 when ωi = 1 and ζi = −1 when
ωi = 0. In this case, we have that
P(ζi,t = 1| ζi,t,mNt ) = η(h−z+J/2·mN (t)), P(ζi,t = −1| ζi,t,mNt ) = 1−η(h−z+J/2·mN (t)),
where now mN (t) = 1N
∑
i ζi,t takes values on [−1, 1]. Arguing similarly as in Barucci &
Tolotti (2012), it can be shown that, under the assumptions of Proposition 1,
lim
N→∞
mNt = mt,
where mt is the unique solution to
m˙t = tanh
{
β
(
h− e+ J · mt
2
)}
−mt; m0 = 2x0 − 1.
Since xt =
mt+1
2 , equation (4) immediately follows. 
The quantity xt characterizes the fraction of innovative firms in a large economy of re-
search firms subject to externalities and private signals. Since (4) provides us with an explicit
expression for describing the behavior of research firms, as we shall see in the next section, it
is now straightforward to incorporate the research industry in a canonical endogenous growth
model. This allows us to understand to what extent the presence of firm interactions in the
research industry is going to affect the macroeconomic outcome, further distinguishing be-
tween the standing-on-the-shoulders and the fishing-out cases. Since the role of the fixed cost
z is negligible in our setting, in the remainder we will set it equal to zero.
8We could in principle use any continuous probability distribution. The logistic is vastly used in the context
of random utility models. One reason being that the dynamics obtained under this assumption have a logistic
shape which seems to represent patterns underlying many social phenomena (see Anderson et al. (1992)).
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3 The Macroeconomic Model
Apart from the characterization of the research market which to some extent resembles what
discussed in Marchese at al. (2014), the model is an almost standard endogenous growth
model characterized by households, productive and research firms, and a government. House-
holds try to maximize their lifetime welfare, by determining how much to consume given the
dynamic evolution of capital. Productive firms produce competitively the unique final con-
sumption good, by determining how many workers and how much capital to employ given the
available technology. Research firms determine whether to invest or not in innovation, and
overall technological progress depends on the share of research firms which actively engage in
research activities. The government aiming at maintaining a balanced budget at any point
in time levies taxes on households to finance such research activities. Households and pro-
ductive firms are homogeneous, thus we analyze their behavior as traditional representative
agents. Research firms are instead heterogeneous in their propensity to innovate, and their
behavior is consistent with what discussed in the previous section.
The representative household’s problem consists of maximizing its welfare given its initial
capital endowment k0 and the law of motion of capital, kt, by choosing how much to consume,
ct, and supplying inelastically labor. The household size, L, is constant and it is assumed
to be infinitely large. Welfare is defined according to the average utilitarian criterion9, thus
it is equal to the infinite discounted sum (ρ is the pure rate of time preference) of instanta-
neous utilities, which depend solely upon consumption. The instantaneous utility function
is assumed to take the following isoelastic form: u(ct) =
c1−σt −1
1−σ , where σ > 1 is the inverse
of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. As usual lowercase letters denote per capita
variables while uppercase letters aggregate variables. The household’s problem in per capita
terms can be written as:
max
ct
W =
∫ ∞
0
c1−σt − 1
1− σ e
−ρtdt (5)
s.t. k˙t = (1− τt)(rtkt + wt)− ct, (6)
where rt is the capital rental rate, wt the wage rate and τt a (time varying) income tax rate.
The first terms in the RHS of (6) represent the disposable income which needs to be allocated
among consumption (ct), and capital investments (k˙t).
Output is produced by competitive productive firms according to a Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function, combining labor, L (inelastically supplied by households), and capital, Kt.
The production function in per capita terms takes the following form:
yt = Atk
α
t (7)
where α ∈ (0, 1) is the capital share while At a technological factor, representing total factor
9Note that since household size is constant, in our model the difference between welfare as defined according
to either the average or total utilitarian criterion is simply a constant, equal to household size (see Marsiglio
(2014) for a recent discussion of the implications of average and total utilitarianism on economic growth).
However, since the size of household is assumed infinitely large (why this is needed will become clear later)
we cannot rely on total utilitarianism since this would imply that household’s objective function is infinite.
7
productivity. Productive firms take the level of technology as given and maximize their
instantaneous profits, determining thus the rental rate of capital, rt (and the wage rate, wt).
Research firms indexed by i = 1, . . . , N are heterogeneous in their propensity to innovate
ωi,t and try to maximize the profits associated with their research activities. Their behavior
is identical to what discussed in the previous section, thus is determined by the comparison
between their profit when innovating (ωi,t = 1) and when not (ωi,t = 0). Whenever innovating
they will sell their innovation at a price h˜t = hyt to the government, which does somehow
finance the research activities in the overall economy. We assume the number of research
firms is infinitely large such that Proposition 1 holds.
The government by taxing households collects the tax revenue τtyt, which is used to buy
innovations at a price (in units of output) h˜t from each research firm actively engaged in
research activities,
∑
i ωi. Thus, the government’s budget constraint reads as follows:
τt` = hxt, (8)
where xt is the share of innovative firms whose dynamics is given in (4) and ` = lim(L,N)→(∞,∞) LN >
0 is the household to research firm ratio.10 Once an innovation is bought by the government,
it is immediately released in the public domain to allow productive firms to use such an
innovation for free to produce the final consumption good (Marchese at al. (2014)).
By financing research activities the government determines the time evolution of the total
factors productivity. Indeed, the overall level of technology is determined by the interaction
among research firms. Specifically, we assume that it evolves according to the following law
of motion:
A˙t = φxtAt, (9)
where φ > 0 is a scale parameter and xt represents the share of research firms which actively
engage in innovative activities. According to (9) for technological progress to occur it does
not matter the size of the research industry (i.e., how many research firms exist) but the
relative size of innovative firms with respect to the industry. If none does research (xt = 0)
then technological progress does not occur, while if all firms do research (xt = 1) then
technological progress occurs at a strictly positive rate φ. For any situation different from
these two extreme cases, the rate of technological progress will lie between 0 and φ, and which
specific rate will arise depends on the behavior of research firms and their interaction within
the research industry.
In general equilibrium, all agents maximize their objective function and all markets clear.
The economy is completely characterized by the following system of differential equations
10Note that the budget constraint is written assuming an infinite number of research firms as in the asymp-
totic model described by Proposition 1. In case of N and L finite, it reads τtytL = hyt
∑
i ωi,t implying that
τtyt
L
N
= hyt
∑
i ωi,t
N
. Letting N (and L) go to infinity, we are back to (8).
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and the given initial conditions k0, x0 and A0:
c˙t
ct
=
1
σ
[(
1− h
`
xt
)
αAtk
α−1
t − ρ
]
(10)
k˙t =
(
1− h
`
xt
)
Atk
α
t − ct (11)
x˙t =
1
2
tanh
{
β
[
h+ J
(
xt − 1
2
)]}
− xt + 1
2
(12)
A˙t = φxtAt (13)
Apart from the case in which xt converges to zero (which however will never be an equilib-
rium), the above system (10), (11), (12) and (13) is not stationary (i.e., it does not show any
equilibrium at all), thus in order to study its dynamic behavior it may be convenient to recast
the system in a stationary system as traditionally done in the endogenous growth literature.
From the equilibrium properties of this latter system, we will then be able to infer the prop-
erties of the BGP equilibrium associated with (10), (11), (12) and (13). A BGP equilibrium
denotes a situation in which all variables grow at a constant (possibly non-negative) rate,
and deriving and discussing the characteristics of the BGP equilibrium is our main goal in
next section.
4 BGP Equilibrium
By introducing the variables χt =
ct
kt
and ϕt = Atk
α−1
t , denoting the consumption to capital
ratio and the average product of capital respectively, it is possible to recast the above system
in the following stationary system:
χ˙t
χt
= χt − ρ
σ
− σ − α
σ
(
1− h
`
xt
)
ϕt (14)
ϕ˙t
ϕt
= φxt − (1− α)
(
1− h
`
xt
)
ϕt + (1− α)χt (15)
x˙t =
1
2
tanh
{
β
[
h+ J
(
xt − 1
2
)]}
− xt + 1
2
(16)
At equilibrium the above system is characterized by the following steady state values:
χ =
(1− α)ρ+ (σ − α)φx
α(1− α) (17)
ϕ =
(1− α)ρ+ σφx
α(1− α)(1− h` x)
, (18)
x =
1
2
tanh
{
β
[
h+ J
(
x− 1
2
)]}
+
1
2
(19)
where x cannot be determined explicitly. However since xt ∈ [0, 1] it follows that x will
always be non-negative. This means that provided that ` > h, the steady state values χ and
9
ϕ will be strictly positive. We summarize results about the BGP equilibria and their stability
in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Assume ` > h; then along a BGP equilibrium, the economic growth rate, γ,
is strictly positive and given by the following expression:
γ ≡ γc = γk = γA
1− α = γy =
φx
1− α > 0, (20)
where x denotes the steady state value of xt. Moreover, there exists a threshold J
t = 2β such
that:
i) if J < 2/β, there exists a unique γ∗ and the unique BGP equilibrium is saddle-point
stable with a two-dimensional stable manifold;
ii) if J > 2/β, there exists a threshold level ht(J, β) > 0 such that:
a) if h > ht(J, β), there exists a unique γ∗ and the unique BGP equilibrium is saddle-
point stable with a two-dimensional stable manifold;
b) if h < ht(J, β), there exist three BGP equilibria corresponding to three values γL <
γM < γH . The intermediate one is saddle-point stable with a one-dimensional
stable manifold, whereas the two extreme ones are (locally) saddle-point stable,
each with a two-dimensional stable manifold.
Proof. By plugging the steady state values of χt and ϕt back in the original equations (10)–
(13), it is straightforward to derive the BGP growth rate γ, as in (20). The characteristics
of γ strictly mimic those of x. Indeed, multiplicity is due to the possible multiplicity of
the steady states of equation (4). As already shown in the literature (see Brock & Durlauf
(2001)), it turns out that, depending on the values of the parameters, we can have a unique
stable equilibrium (x¯) for (4) or three equilibria (xL < xM < xH), two of which are locally
stable (xL and xH). A similar threshold value for J is also derived by Brock & Durlauf
(2001).11 From (20), if there are multiple equilibria for x, then the system admits multiple
equilibria as well.
Concerning stability, by linearization around a steady state it is possible to analyze the
(local) stability properties of the above system by deriving the following Jacobian matrix:
J(χ, ϕ, x) =
 χ −σ−ασ (1− h` x)χ σ−ασ h`ϕχ(1− α)ϕ −(1− α)(1− h` x)ϕ φϕ+ (1− α)h`ϕ2
0 0 Λ
 , (21)
where Λ = ∂x˙t∂xt |xt=x. It is straightforward to show that the eigenvalues are given by the
following expressions λ1 = Λ, and λ2,3 =
∆±√∆2+Θ
2 , where ∆ = χ − (1 − α)(1 − h` x)ϕ > 0
and Θ = 4ασ (1 − α)(1 − h` x)χ ϕ > 0, from which it directly follows that λ2 > 0 and λ3 < 0.
Independently of what the sign of Λ is, there exists at least one positive and one negative
eigenvalue, thus any possible equilibrium is saddle-point stable. Moreover, it is possible to
11In Brock & Durlauf (2001), the threshold is 1/β. The factor 2, appearing in our statement, depends on
the transformation from the variable mt to the rescaled variable xt as shown in the proof of Proposition 1.
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show that Λ < 0 for x¯L and x¯H and Λ > 0 for x¯M . Therefore, the stable manifold associated
with the three equilibria has dimension 2 for γL and γH and dimension one for γM . 
The parameter condition required by Proposition 2 is needed in order to ensure that the
BGP equilibrium is well defined. Intuitively, it requires that the household to research firm
ratio (`) is large enough to provide the government with the resources needed to promote
research activities (h). Along a BGP the economic growth rate γ depends negatively on
α and positively on φ and, more importantly on the equilibrium share of innovative firms
x. This means that our model economy does not show any scale effect, since the growth
rate is independent of any aggregate variable12. However, since the equilibrium share of
research firms may not be unique, also the BGP equilibrium turns out to be not unique,
and this is strictly related to the size of the externality parameter, J . Indeed, Proposition 2
suggests that in the fishing-out case (J < 0) there always exists a unique saddle-point stable
BGP equilibrium; however, in the standing-on-the-shoulder case (J > 0) there is a richer
variety of possible outcomes. Whenever the standing-on-the-shoulder effect is weak (i.e.,
the magnitude of the positive externality is small) a unique stable equilibrium will emerge.
In the case of a sufficiently large externality, then the number of equilibria depends on the
value of the incentive mechanism provided by the amount of revenues obtained, h. A large
h makes the equilibrium unique, whereas, a small h gives rise to the presence of two locally
stable equilibria.13 As a matter of expositional simplicity, in the following we will refer to
the case (i) in Proposition 2 as the “small externality case” and to the case (ii) as the “large
externality case”. Note that the macroeconomic behavior closely resembles the behavior on
the innovation share, and when the equilibrium innovation share is unique (multiple) then the
BGP equilibrium is unique (multiple) as well. Specifically, in the case of multiple equilibria,
if x0 < xM then xt will converge to xL (and the BGP growth rate will be low, γL), while
if x0 > xM then xH will be reached instead (and the BGP growth rate will be high, γH).
Thus, the initial fraction of innovative firms plays a crucial role in determining which BGP
equilibrium will be effectively achieved.14
In order to understand more in depth what are the characteristics of the BGP equilib-
rium, we now analyze the behavior of the economy under a realistic model’s parametrization.
Specifically, we set the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, σ, equal to 2, the
rate of time preference, ρ, to 0.04, the capital share, α to 0.33 (Mullingan and Sala–i–Martin
(1993)); the scale parameter determining the rate of growth of technology, φ is calibrated to
0.4, in order to obtain an economic growth rate equal to 0.03 (in the case in which the equi-
librium share of innovative firms is exactly equal to one half); the other parameter values, are
set arbitrarily in order to make sure that the assumption required in Proposition 2 is met and
12An increase in the number of firms in the research industry does not rise the overall economic growth
rate. This rate can increase only if the equilibrium share of innovative firms rises.
13Note that the intermediate equilibrium γM , although saddle point stable, is derived from an innovation
share xM which is linearly unstable on its own. Therefore, unless we assume that the economy is exactly
tuned on x0 = x¯M , this equilibrium will never emerge. For this reason, we will not consider it as a possible
realist economic outcome.
14The importance of the initial share of innovative firms for the model’s outcome is further discussed in
Section 4.1 where we focus on the finite-number of research firms case. We will show that in such a (stochastic)
framework the presence of multiple equilibria might give rise to growth cycles.
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that our qualitative results are as clear as possible. We thus set the households to research
firm ratio, `, equal to 1000, the measure of the dispersion of opinion in the population of
research firms, β equal to 1, while we let the revenue provided to research firms, h, and the
size of the externality parameter, J , vary in order to see how they affect the BGP economic
growth rate γ. Table 1 summarizes the parameter values employed in our analysis.
σ ρ α ` φ β
2 0.04 0.33 1000 0.4 1
Table 1: Parameter values employed in our simulation.
In Figure 1 we show how the BGP growth rate γ varies for different values of the ex-
ternality parameter,15 J , whenever the revenue parameter, h is set equal to 0. As expected
from Proposition 2, for negative and positive but small enough values of the externality pa-
rameter a unique BGP and thus a unique economic growth rate, γ∗ = φx
∗
1−α (equal to 0.03),
exist. For larger values, three equilibria, namely γL =
φxL
1−α , γM =
φxM
1−α and γH =
φxH
1−α with
γL < γM < γH , exist and the gap between the high and low economic growth rate, γH − γL
rises with J .
−1 0 1 2 3 4
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
γ
J
Figure 1: Changes in the economic growth rate, γ, for different values of the externality
parameter, J (revenue parameter, h set equal to 0).
Since the existence of either a unique or multiple BGP equilibrium is related to the size of
the externality parameter, it may be convenient to separately analyze the cases in which the
externality parameter is either small or large. In Figure 2 we thus consider two alternative
values J = 1.9 and J = 2.5, lying below and above the threshold value J t = 2 (see Figure 1)
respectively, and show how the BGP growth rate γ varies with the revenue parameter, h. As
discussed above, the small externality case represents a situation in which the research sector
is characterized by either fishing-out (J < 0) or weak standing-on-the-shoulder (0 < J ≤ J t)
15J varies between 0 and 4. This range has been proved to be large enough to show the desired transition
effects.
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effects. In both the cases, equation (16) shows a unique stable equilibrium and consequently
the BGP equilibrium is unique as well: γ∗ = φx
∗
1−α . The convergence to the steady state
of the system (14)–(16) will occur along a two-dimensional stable manifold. We can see
that the unique economic growth rate increases with h, thus the higher the incentive for
research firms to engage in research activities the faster the economic growth (Figure 2, left
panel). The large externality case represents instead a situation in which the research sector
is characterized by a strong standing-on-the-shoulder (J > J t) effect. In this case, equation
(16) shows three equilibria (xL < xM < xH), two of which are locally stable (xL and xH).
As a consequence, the BGP equilibrium is not unique as well: we need to distinguish three
BGP equilibria, characterized by an economic growth rate equal to γL =
φxL
1−α , γM =
φxM
1−α and
γH =
φxH
1−α with γL < γM < γH , respectively. As seen from Proposition 2, the convergence
to such three steady states of the system (14)–(16) will occur either along a two-dimensional
stable manifold (for γL and γH) or along a one-dimensional stable manifold (for γM ). We
can see that the high and low economic growth rate, γH and γL increase with h, while the
medium one γM falls with h; thus the higher the incentive for research firms to engage in
research activities the faster the economic growth in each of the two stable equilibria (Figure
2, right panel). Note that the threshold value for h is ht ≈ 0.078, meaning that only whenever
0 ≤ h < ht, three equilibria exist.
Figure 2 suggests some interesting policy implications, since it clearly shows how the
revenue parameter impacts on the equilibrium economic growth rate. Indeed, in the large
externality case whenever the revenue provided to research firms is small (h < ht), three
different BGP equilibria exist, and this is strictly related to the existence of three different
equilibrium values for the innovation share. Therefore, the same economy may experience
different growth rates according to how many research firms actively engage in research
activities: if this share is small the economic growth rate will be low while if it is large the
economic growth rate will be high. This means that the economy is potentially faced with
a low growth trap, which may condemn it to grow slower than what it could potentially
do. In such a framework it is natural to wonder what policymakers can do in order to deal
with this problem. As traditionally discussed mainly in the context of poverty traps (Sachs
et al (2004)), an economy may escape its low growth trap by increasing the innovation
share, allowing thus the initial share of research firms (x0) to exceed its unstable middle
equilibrium (xM ). Such an outcome might be implemented by simply opening the economy
to international trade and providing some incentive for foreign firms actively engaged in
research activities to operate also on the domestic market; research activities at international
level may thus provide the economy with the push it needs to achieve fast economic growth.
However, policymakers may do much more than this, since they can effectively allow the
economy not only to escape its low growth trap, but to even solve completely the trap
problem. Indeed, by rising enough the revenue provided to each research firm such that
h > ht, the innovation share will naturally converge towards its unique (higher) equilibrium
value and thus the economic growth rate at equilibrium will be high and thus the economy will
not be trapped into a low growth equilibrium. Such an outcome can be easily implemented
by increasing the tax rate applied to households’ income in order to finance the increase in
the revenue parameter. Indeed, in our model’s parametrization the tax parameter τˆ needed
13
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Figure 2: Changes in the growth rate, γ, for different values of the revenue parameter h
(0 ≤ h ≤ 0.2); the externality parameter, J set equal to either 1.9 (left panel) or 2.5 (right
panel).
to escape the low growth trap is τˆ = h` x ≈ 0.0413%. The result should be clear from Figure
2, and it can also be seen from Figure 3 where we plot the equilibrium values of x for two
different values of the revenue parameter h. This clearly show that with a higher h a unique
equilibrium x∗ (and thus also a unique BGP) may exist.
4.1 Endogenous Cycles
We conclude the discussion about the potential implications of our model by analyzing
through a simple example the finite version of the research industry. Indeed, recall that
xt describes exactly the deterministic evolution of the research industry under the modeling
assumption that N is infinite, thus what we have analyzed thus far represents simply an
approximation of the true behavior of the system. We thus now focus on the case in which N
is finite in order to understand what the presence of random shocks to the cost components of
firms might imply for the economy. Let us focus on the large externality case, and specifically
on a situation in which multiple BGP equilibria exist (case ii.b in Proposition 2). In such a
14
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Figure 3: Equilibrium values x ∈ [0, 1] (marked with a star) found as the intersection between
the bisector line and f(x) = 12 tanh
{
β
[
h+ J
(
x− 12
)]}
+ 12 (see equation (19)). Parameters
values: h = 0 (left panel) and h = 0.15 (right panel), with J = 2.5.
case two stable BGP equilibria exist, and as discussed above which equilibrium our economy
will achieve depends upon the initial conditions (χ0, ϕ0, x0), and in particular a critical role is
played by the initial condition on xt. Indeed, the initial share of innovative firms determines
whether the equilibrium share will be high or low, determining thus whether the economic
growth rate, γ, will be high or low. While this outcome is clear in the infinitely large number
of research firms version of the problem, whether this holds true also for the finite version
is not so obvious. In fact, in the finite version of the model, research firms are subject to
random shocks which determine whether they will decide to innovate or not; in the infinite
version the effects of such shocks cannot be analyzed since equation (16) turns out to be
completely deterministic.
Let us denote by xNt the proportion of innovative firms at time t among a total population
of N firms. As theoretically proved for a wider class of probabilistic models in Mathieu and
Picco (1998), under the assumptions of case ii.b in Proposition 2, the trajectory xNt has a
metastable behavior16: it fluctuates close to one of the two equilibria, say x¯H and, after a
random time, it suddenly jumps to values close to x¯L. This gives rise to a cycling behavior
of the finite dimensional system. Note that this random jumps happen with probability one
for each trajectory, although the jump times could be possibly large. A formal statistical
analysis of the finite dimensional model and the calibration of such a random time is out of
the scope of this paper, but the theory of metastability suggests that this random time is
exponential in N and depends on the parameters of the model and on the shape of the basin
of attractions of the two locally stable equilibria. Indeed, it turns out that, for values of J
close to J t, the random time needed to exit the basin of attraction of the two locally stable
16A probabilistic system exhibits a metastable behavior when it remains for long times close to an apparent
equilibrium, (called metastable), then it suddenly relaxes to the true equilibrium state. It can be proved that,
on a suitable time-scale, the process therefore behaves like a pure jump process with two states. For more
details, see for instance Mathieu and Picco (1998).
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equilibria is relatively small and trajectories showing growth cycles arise. In Figure 4 (right
panel), we provide an example showing that, for J = 2.05 (recall that J t = 2), this random
time is reached early enough to be seen in the trajectory. More precisely, we show that the
(stochastic) time series of xNt may deviate from its expected behavior predicted by equation
(16). Recall that xt describes exactly the deterministic evolution of the system under the
modeling assumption that N is infinite. In the left panel we show that xNt may converge to
the equilibrium it is not supposed to achieve. Indeed, since the initial condition x0 = 0.1 is
greatly lower than xM = 0.4178, we would expect the time series of x
N
t to fluctuate around
the red-dashed trajectory x
(L)
t leading to the low equilibrium. However, in this particular
simulation, this is not the case: the trajectory deviates and start fluctuating around the high
equilibrium xH . In the right panel, as said, we show that the finite dimensional trajectory
xNt may spend quite a long time close to one of the two equilibria and then depart from
it to reach the other one. What discussed for xNt has clear implications also in terms of
the macroeconomic outcome: differently from what suggested by the (deterministic) theory,
the system, even when the initial conditions are very close to the high BGP equilibrium,
may converge towards the low BGP equilibrium or oscillate between the two BGP equilibria
without converging to a steady state. Note that in the small externality case, in which the
equilibrium is unique, such an effect naturally disappears. This suggests that government
intervention may be essential not only to allow the economy to solve its eventual low growth
trap problem but also to reduce the fluctuations in economic activity.
5 Middle-Income Trap
An interesting line of interpretation of our stylized model is related to the middle-income trap
hypothesis17. This refers to the experience common to many developing countries (especially
in Latin America and in the Middle East) in the second half of the XIX century, in which
growth has significantly slowed down after a first stage of take off characterized by rapid
growth (see Gill and Kharas (2007), Commission on Growth and Development (2008)).
This development process has allowed these economies to quickly move from a low-income
to a middle-income status, but not to make the further leap needed to become high-income
economies. This has advanced the hypothesis that there may exist a middle-income trap,
preventing thus some economies to fill the gap with more advanced countries. What might
be the specific hindrances affecting this second stage of economic development is still an open
question, but these are likely to be substantially different from those involving the first stage
in which traditional poverty traps are in place.
Understanding thus what may be the reason why some fast growing economies have failed
to achieved a high-income status is an active and recent research question with clear policy
implications. While empirical evidence supporting the existence of a middle-income trap
seems robust and convincing, much less clear is from a theoretical point of view why fast
growth might come to an end. On the empirical side, Eichengreen et al. (2012) show that
growth tends to slowdown at levels of per capita income of about $15,000 (at 2005 constant
17The term “middle-income trap” has been originally introduced by Gill and Kharas (2007), and the notion
has also often been referred to as “growth slowdown” (Eichengreen et al. (2012)).
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Figure 4: The evolution of xNt (in blue) for a finite dimensional system of N = 1, 000 firms.
In the left panel, we see the deviation from the expected trajectory x
(L)
t suggested by the
model in favor of x
(H)
t . In the right panel we have a trajectory fluctuating around the two
attractors. Parameters are as in Table 1 with h = 0.01 and J = 2.14 (left panel) and h = 0
and J = 2.05 (right panel).
international PPP prices), suggesting that a critical role is played by a reduction in the growth
rate of the total factor productivity (TFP); specifically, a drop in TFP growth represents
about 85% of the fall in per capita income growth. Eichengreen et al. (2013) provide some
additional evidence, showing that the distribution of growth slowdowns is not necessarily
unimodal, and in particular two modes, one around $15,000 and another around $11,000,
exist. On the theoretical side, very few works have tried to provide some explanation of
growth slowdowns in middle-income countries, and they focus on reallocation or misallocation
of workers between different economic sectors. A traditional argument suggests that while
in earlier stages of development it may be possible to raise productivity by shifting workers
from agriculture to industry, this process may come to an end whenever the share of workers
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employed in agriculture falls enough (Lewis (1954)). A more recent explanation emphasizes
that a low allocation of high skilled individuals in the research sector may give rise to low
productivity growth; however, this situation of potential slow growth can be fixed by policy
interventions (Age´nor and Canuto (2015)). Differently from these works in which inter-
sector dynamics is the driver of eventual growth slowdowns, our paper provides an alternative
explanation based entirely on social interactions and technology diffusion.
Along the lines of Age´nor and Canuto (2015), whenever the economy experiences multiple
BGP equilibria (Proposition 2, case ii.b), the intermediate BGP equilibrium γM (i.e., the low
growth trap threshold) can be clearly interpreted as a middle-income trap, separating fast
and slow growing economies. Note that the eventual existence of such a trap is determined by
the outcome in the research industry, which is completely driven by social interactions among
research firms. Thus, the research intra-sector dynamics only might explain why technological
progress and thus economic growth tend to be high or low in specific economies. In order
to relate this to the pattern advanced by the middle-income trap hypothesis we need to
understand why an economy initially (during a first stage of economic development) in a
BGP with high economic growth rate, γH , may end up (in the second stage of development)
in a BGP equilibrium with low growth rate, γL, later. In our setting this is equivalent to a
either a fall in the number of innovative firms xt or a rise in the intermediate equilibrium
of the innovation share, xM ; both the cases imply that an economy with an original high
innovation share may end up with a low (compared with the critical threshold) innovation
share and thus experiencing a slowdown in its economic growth. The former case may be
triggered by a change in international policy, and specifically it may occur as a result of the
introduction of tariffs or other restrictive policies, which by providing negative incentives for
foreign firms to operate on the domestic market, leads some foreign firms engaged in research
activity to exit the domestic research market. The latter case may instead be triggered by
a change in domestic economic policy, and it may occur as a result of a reduction in the
support provided to research firms which, by determining the amount of revenue received by
innovative firms, tends to increase the intermediate equilibrium value of the share of firms
engaged in research activities. While empirical evidence seems to supports our conclusions
related to the negative relation between growth slowdowns and openness (Eichengreen et al.
(2012)), the available evidence does not allow to either support or refute those related to
the positive (up to a certain point) nexus between growth slowdowns and research-enhancing
policies.
Apart from the eventual existence of such a middle-income trap, our model differently from
Age´nor and Canuto (2015) suggests that also growth cycles may occur. This implies that
also fast growing economies cannot claim to have definitely escaped their middle-income trap,
since they may be cyclically pulled into situations of growth slowdowns. This reinforces our
previous conclusions that policymakers can play a critical role in the development process.
By actively intervening with specific policies they can completely solve the trap problem
dampening the size of the growth fluctuations, promoting a smooth process of fast growth
allowing the economy to eventually catch up with more advanced economies and become a
high-income country.
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6 Conclusion
Technological progress is by far the most important determinant of economic growth over the
long run. However, whether and how the interaction among research firms in the research
industry might determine the technological progress has never been analyzed thus far in the
growth literature. Thus, in this paper we try to fill this gap by allowing a certain degree of
firms interaction. Specifically, we assume that firms decide whether to innovate or not by
taking into account also what other research firms do. Such an interaction among research
firms, by determining the rate of technological progress, plays a critical role in shaping the
whole macroeconomic outcome. Indeed, we show that under certain parameter conditions, by
mimicking the behavior of the share of innovative firms, the economy may be characterized by
a multiplicity of balanced growth path (BGP) equilibria, and eventually may face a situation
of low growth trap. We have also shown that the economy may eventually (endogenously)
fluctuate between the low and high BGP generating thus a growth cycle in which periods of
low and high economic growth rates follow one another. The potential existence of low growth
traps and endogenous growth cycles suggest that the government might play an essential role
in order to contrast such negative effects. In particular, by rising enough the tax rate applied
to households’ income it could completely solve the low growth trap problem, avoiding thus
further fluctuations in economic activity.
This paper represents a first attempt to enrich the macroeconomic dynamics in traditional
models of endogenous growth by allowing a certain extent of externality in the level of research
innovation. The approach followed is thus quite simplistic on purpose in order to show in
the simplest possible way which might be the potential implications of allowing for social
interactions in traditional macroeconomic models. Of course, our framework has several
limitations which need to be accounted for in future research. Specifically, the law of motion
of the share of innovative firms turns out to be independent of the other macroeconomic
variables; this assumption needs to be relaxed in order to establish a mutual nexus between
the macroeconomic setup and the degree of social interactions. Also the specification of
the research market is overly simple, and adopting a more traditional setup with either
horizontal or vertical product differentiation (Acemoglu (2009)) may shed some further light
on the impacts of social interactions on macroeconomic outcomes. Extending the analysis
along these lines is left for future research.
A The Rationale behind Random Utility Models
In this appendix we briefly summarize the main ideas recovered by Brock & Durlauf (2001)
and leading to the profit structure defined in (1). Suppose that a research firm faces the binary
decision to innovate or not to innovate. We define the binary random variable ω ∈ {0, 1}
accordingly. The main assumption behind random utility models is that the profit pi related
to the innovation has the following general structure:
pi(ωi) = R(ωi, µ
e
i (ω−i), h)− ζ(ωi),
where revenues R depend on the choice made by the firm, on the price h received by the buyer
of the innovation and by an externality term. Indeed, each firm i estimates the conditional
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probability measure µei on the choices of others, where ω−i denotes the vector of actions
deprived of the i-th component. As seen in Section 2, costs are random and denoted by ζ.
For the moment, we set z = 0 for simplicity.
We now make some further (minimal) assumptions to came up with a tractable profit
structure.
i) pi(0) = 0. This is an obvious normalization. Both R and ζ are zero if no research
activity is in place. Therefore, we concentrate on pi(1) (we call it simpy pi). Rearranging
variables and notations we have:
pi = R(µei (ω−i), h)− ζi.
ii) Externalities due to the behavior of competitors, only depend on the average action
of others’ choice. This implies that µei (ω−i) is substituted by the (simpler) statistics
xei =
1
N−1
∑
j 6=i x
e
ij , where x
e
ij = E(i)[ωj ] denotes the expectation of firm i about the
choice of competitor j. Therefore,
pi = R(xei , h)− ζi.
Concerning the information structure of the model, we also assume that E(i)[·] = E(j)[·]
for all i, j = 1, . . . , N . This amounts in saying that all firms share the same expectations
about others’ choices.
iii) We assume that ∂pi∂xei
= J . This simplifying assumption introduces a unique parameter
J measuring the degree of dependence (or the force of externality) due to the others’
actions. Note that J > 0 resembles a staying-on-the-shoulder situation, whereas J < 0
a fishing-out case. Secondly, as obvious, ∂pi∂h > 0.
iv) We assume that the monetary effects due to the sale of the technology and the exter-
nalities are additive. Moreover, for sake of simplicity, we assume a linear dependence.
This fact, together with assumption iii), produces the following payoff
pi = h+ Jxei − ζi.
v) Finally, we slightly correct xei by substituting it with x
e
i − 12 . The reason is that we
want the decision to be driven by what the majority of the population of firms is doing.
The quantity xei − 12 reflects exactly this goal: it is positive if and only if the majority
of the research firms produces an innovation. Therefore, in case of a positive J , the
single firm is more prone to be aligned with the majority. On the contrary, if J < 0,
the firm will tend to behave in the opposite direction. We obtain
pi = h− ζi + J
(
xei −
1
2
)
.
Therefore, by reintroducing a private cost z and recalling that pi(0) = 0, we obtain the
general expression for pi as it appears in (1):
pi(ωi) = ωi
[
h− (z + ζi) + J
(
xei −
1
2
)]
.
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